Hearos (Insights) on Daf Yomi

Tosafos quotes the mishnah in bikurim that says that a ger doesn't read the parsha of arami oveid...when he brings bikurim, because he can't declare "שהנחלת לאבותינו". Based on this, there is a discussion even when a ger davens whether he should say אלקי אבותיכם. The R"I holds that a ger can daven the same nusach of אלקי אבותינו because we pasken like R' Yehuda who holds in the yerushalmi that a ger can read the parsha of bikurim since avrohom was אב המון גוים. The Rambam also paskens like the R"I and holds that a ger can read the parsha by bikurim basedon the fact that avrohom was the father of the whole world since he brought them under the wings of the shechina (bikurim 4:3).

The Mishneh L'melech asks that even if goyim are able to consider avrohom their father and say שהנחלת לאבותינו, but practically speaking they don't have a portion in EY, so they shouldn't be able to read the parsha, just as women cannot read since they have no portion in the land and cannot say פרי האדמה אשר נתת לי? Why is a ger more able to say האדמה אשר נתת לי than a woman?

The Nemukei Yosef asks a similar question. Why is a Ger able to be motzi a born jew in birchas hamazon (which implies that he is chayev m'doraysa), he shouldn't be any better than a woman whereby the gemara has a tzad in Brachos that she is only be obligated in bentching m'drabonon since she doesn't have a chelek in EY? The Nimukei Yosef answers that a Ger is fit to receive an inheritance, just that he wasn't around at the time of yetzi'as mitzrayim when it was actually divided. Since a ger qualifies as a בן נחלה, he is obligated m'doraysa in bentching, unlike a woman who is not a bas nachala at all. This can also explain why he can declare האדמה אשר נתת לי, because he is fit to receive a portion, just that he wasn't present at the time it was distributed.

But in truth, this answer doesn't work for reading bikurim. The gemara says that one who doesn't own property cannot read the parsha of bikurim, even though he is a born jew and fit to own property. Clearly, the gemara holds that he must have actual ownership and control over property to make the declaration and it isn't sufficient to have a theoretical chelek in EY. Therefore, a ger who doesn't have any actual ownership over property should still not be able to read the parsha of bikurim. Furthermore, the Rambam is still difficult because the rambam himself writes that a ger cannot say viduy ma'aser since he doesn't have a chelek in EY, so why can he read the parsha of bikurim?

The Mishneh L'melech quotes an answer from the sefer kapos temarim (3rd perek of succah) that in the context of bikurim the pasuk says אשר נשבעת לאבותינו לתת לנו which speaks of the future. In the future a ger will have a portion in EY. Even though the geirim in the midbar didn't receive a chelek, that is because their conversion wasn't לשם שמים, but geirim who converted nowadays will receive a portion in EY in the future. But, by viduy ma'aser where the pasuk says אשר נתת לנו ה' כאשר נשבעת לאבותינו which is in the past, implies that he must already have a chelek, therefore a ger cannot say viduy ma'aser.

1. Tosafos asks why we need a pasuk to exclude chutz la'aretz, since anyway bikurim is a mitzvah on fruits which are dependent on the land such as the mitzvah of teruma and ma'aser, which by default only applies in EY? Tosafos answers that the definition of mitzva that is te'luya ba'aretz, is when the mitzvah is on the produce rather than on the "gavra". The litmus test is whether the actual fruits are forbidden to eat prior to performing the mitzvah. Since the fruits are assur prior to teruma and ma'aser, we consider it a mitzva that is dependent on the land and by default only applies in EY. But by bikurim where there is no restriction on eating the fruits, we view it as a mitzvah that is not dependent on the land, rather on the person himself. Tosafos then points out that when we call bikurim a "cho'vas ha'guf", we don't mean that it is an actual obligation, because one need not purchase land from which to bring bikurim. Rather we consider bikurim like the mitzvah of tzitzis, so that if one finds themself in the situation of having a 4 cornered garment, or having first fruits, they are obligated to do the mitzvah.

Regarding the mitzvah of tzitzis we find in the gemara in menachos that the angel rebuked R' Katina for avoiding the mitzvah of tzitzis. Therefore, it is proper to go out of one's way to do the mitzvah even though they aren't obligated. Would we apply the same concept to bikurim and recommend going out of one's way to perform the mitzvah?

2. The gemara says that really the mitzvah of bringing bikurim and the reading go hand in hand, however when one purchases 2 trees (according to rabbonon) it is a safeik whether they acquire property with it. Therefore, the safeik will require the bikurim to be brought because safeik d'oraysa l'chumra, but not do read since it is a safeik issur since he will be declaring that he has property when he in truth doesn't. Whether he brings bikurim or not, he will passively be violating a mitzvah. If he brings bikurim, he will be violating the mitzvah of reading the parsha. If he doesn't bring it he will be violating the mitzvah to bring bikurim (but not the mitzvah to read the parsha, since the mecha'yev presumably will only be when he actually brings it). So, why would we require him to bring it, since either way he will be mevatel a mitzvah? Two possible answers: A. When he fails to bring bikurim he is me'vatel the mitzvah b'meizid, but when he doesn't read he is only mevatel the mitzvah b'ones (since reading would be sheker). It is better to be mevatel the mitzvah b'ones, rather then b'meizid. B. At the moment his chiyuv is to bring bikurim mi'safeik d'oraysa. The fact that he will in the end be mevatel the mitzvah of reading would not exempt him from fulfilling the mitzvah that is incumbent upon him right now.

3. The gemara says that we apply the concept of ראוי לבילה to the mitzvah of bikurim. Only bikurim that is fit to read the parsha is obligated to be brought, but if it is not fit for the reading then there is an exemption on the bringing. The Rashbam explains that when there is a safeik whether he is chayev in bikurim he is patur from bringing bikurim because on the tzad that he is chayev, he has an obligation to read. Since he can't read the parsha out of concern that he will be saying sheker, it is considered unfit for reading which is me'akev the bringing.

Why is this true - we should say ממה נפשך, on the tzad that he is chayev it is fit for reading, on the tzad that he is patur he has no obligation to bring at all? It seems that the rashbam holds that the concept of being fit for reading is on the "gavra". Meaning, that there is a tzad that the fruits require a kri'ah, and the "gavra" is unfit for a kri'ah since he can't say sheker, so this should exempt him from bringing altogether.

In the gemara, there are 2 different girsa'os in what ameimar says. The Rashbam is go'res that ameimar paskens that debts can be sold by giving them over (which tosafos 76a understands to be a supercharged meshicha, meaning that it requires both meshicah and handing over the contract by a da'as acheres makneh, unlike mesira by large animals which is a lower level kinyan than meshicha [according to R"I, but R"T holds mesira is better than meshicha]). Based on the girsa of the Rashbam, when the gemara offers the logic for ameimar: אותיות מילי נינהו ומילי במילי לא מיקנין, it is a justification for mesira working without writing a separate contract. The Rashbam explains that a contract is just words, "mili", and a contract cannot be used to acquire a contract, therefore the effective kinyan should be mesira alone. Tosafos on the other hand is go'reis in ameimar that mesira is insufficient and that there also must be a second contract written on the first. Tosafos goes lishitasam in explaining the sevara of the gemara that "mili" can't be used to acquire "mili", means that just the mesira of the debt contract is nothing more than mili, therefore another contract must be written on the first.

Tosafos 77b asks that the gemara tries to prove that mili can be acquired with mili from the case where a person acquires a field and automatically acquires the pre-written shtar of the field with it. What is the proof? In that case the buyers name is actually written in the contract, therefore he acquires the contract with the field, but how would this prove that when the buyers name isn't written in the contract he should also acquire the contract with just a mesira? It seems that this question is tosafos li'shitasam who understand that the mesira of the shtar is called mili, therefore they can ask that we can't compare a case where the buyer is named in the contract to a case where he isn't named. But according to the rashbam where the whole issue of mili is that a shtar can only be acquired by mesira, it is fair for the gemara to ask from this case where he is able to acquire the contract without a mesira, which avoids the question of tosafos.

Now, according to those who require kesiva and mesira, what is the rationale? Why is mesira alone not enough, and what does a second shtar add? The Nemukei Yosef quotes the rashba who says that one must first do the mesira of the shtar and only afterward would they write a second shtar. The rationale of the rashba is: משום דשעבוד לבדו אינו נקנה קודם שיזכה בשטר החוב כיון דהשבעוב לא מהניא לגוף הנייר. The Rashba seems to understand that the mesira is a kinyan on the paper of the shtar, and the second contract is a kinyan on the shi'bud to collect from the borrower, therefore the kinyan on the paper must come first because without that you can't transfer the shi'bud. The Rashba seems to hold that the problem with mesira alone is that it is only a kinyan on the paper, the problem with shtar alone is that paper can't be acquired with a shtar (but the shi'bud can), therefore we need both so that the buyer will own the paper and the shi'bud. However, it seems to me that the Rashbam understands differently. The rashbam (bottom 76a) seems to hold that if we only have mesira alone, the borrower can claim that the buyer only purchased the paper and nothing else. Based on his approach, the shtar doesn't act as a ma'aseh kinyan on the shi'bud, rather it is a giluy (reveals) that the ma'aseh kinyan of the mesira was not just for the paper, but rather for the actual shi'bud. In other words, the Rashba and Rashbam argue whether the "kesiva" of the second contract is an independent ma'aseh kinyan to acquire the shi'bud (rashba) or is not a ma'aseh kinyan at all, it is just a giluy that the ma'aseh kinyan of mesira was for the purpose of the shi'bud and not just the paper (rashbam).

There are two basic approaches when it comes to selling contracts. Tosafos writes in many places that the entire concept of selling or purchasing the right to collect, is only d'rabonon, because on a torah level one can only sell something that is tangible. With this Tosafos explains why the lender even after selling the contract, retains the ability to be mochel the contract. Since the lender remains the "owner" on a torah level, he has the ability to be mochel the money that he is owed. The Ran, Ritva and Rosh in kesubos all quote Rabbeinu Tam who holds that the ability to transfer the ownership of the contract is really d'oraysa. The rationale as to why the lender can still be mochel the contract is that every contract has 2 shi'budim: 1. a lean on the borrower himself. 2. a lean on the property of the borrower. The lender only has the ability to sell and transfer ownership of #2, the lean he has on the borrowers property, which will enable someone else to collect from it. But, the lender cannot transfer the lean on the borrower himself. Since the lender retains the lean on the borrower himself, he can be mochel that lean, thereby undermining the right of the buyer to collect from the borrowers property. The Shach (c.m. 66:1) has a very long discussion where he cites many opinions who hold like tosafos that mechiras shtaros is only d'rabonon, but ultimately paskens that it is d'oraysa (he has an elaborate discussion arguing that the shita of the Ri"f is that it is d'oraysa).

Tosafos 66b is troubled that according to their opinion that mechiras shtaros is only d'rabonon, why do we need a pasuk to exclude shtaros from o'na'ah. The entire concept of ona'ah only exists when one sells a contract, and the whole concept of selling isn't d'oraysa? Tosafos answers that we need the pasuk for a case where the lender lost the contract, and the finder overcharges when he sells it back to the lender. The ketzos 66:1 struggles with trying to understand what tosafos means. If the torah doesn't recognize the ability to transfer ownership of contracts, then the lender will always legally be the one who has the right to collect with the contract. So, how can the finder actually "sell" the contract back to the lender, the debt of the contract always belongs to the lender, not the finder. The ketzos explains that we are speaking about a case where the lender was meya'esh on the contract. Through the yi'ush of the lender, the finder is zocheh in the ability to collect with this contract which he then sells back to the lender (and overcharges - the pasuk excludes this case from ona'ah). Why does yi'ush work to entitle the finder to collect using this contract, whereas selling the contract doesn't work to allow the buyer to collect? The ketzos explains based on Tosafos that the inability to sell a contract stems from the fact that the money that is owed is not in the reshus of the seller (lender), and one cannot sell something that is not in their reshus. However, yi'ush works by lost objects that aren't in the owners reshus, therefore yi'ush works to remove the rights of the lender and allows the finder to be the new "owner" of the contract.

The approach of the ketzos is a big chiddush. Simply speaking, Tosafos holds that the lender who is the holder of the contract has no ability to transfer his ownership to anyone else. If the ketzos is correct that he can be me'ya'esh on the contract enabling the finder to collect with it, even when he sells the contract we should interpret the sale as a yi'ush (since he recognizes that he won't ever be able to collect with it) which enables the buyer to now own the rights of collection? The nesivos disagrees with the ketzos. Although one can be meya'esh from something not in his possession, the Nesivos argues that the finder would not become the new "owner", rather the borrower would own it by not having to pay. Therefore, the Nesivos explains that Tosafos holds that the lender has the ability to sell the paper of the contract to a buyer who will then be able to decide whether to sell it to back to the lender, or sell it to the borrower so that the lender cannot legally collect from him. Therefore, if the lender looses the contract and is me'yaesh, the finder is zocheh in the paper of the contract and now has the ability to sell it either to the lender or to the borrower. This type of sale would be d'oraysa, and therefore yi'ush would also work m'doraysa, therefore we need a pasuk to exclude it from ona'ah.

One of the issues that arose in the course of learning these aggados is whether one is able to make a birchas hatorah on reading and translating even without understanding the code. In most aggadata we are able to draw a message or a point which without question would qualify as limud ha'torah and warrant a birchas hatorah, even if we don't fully understand the message. However, particularly in the stories of Rabba Bar Bar Chana, where each parable is nothing more than a metaphor and has no "pashut pehsat", it is fair to wonder whether reading and translating would warrant a birkas ha'torah. Surely, to learn the gemara with the maharsha or the gr"a it would be serious limud ha'torah, but what about merely reading and translating the words? Similarly, when one would learn the refuah gemaras in the 7th perek of gittin, on which r' akiva eiger in hilchos aveilus has pointed out no longer apply, would they warrant a birchas hatorah?

The entire question is based on the assumption that if one were to read chezkas habatim or any other gemara, without having any understanding what the gemara is saying, would not qualify as limud and would not require a birkas hatorah. I always assumed that we follow the shulchan aruch of the gra"z who writes (hilchos talmud torah 2:12-13):

אך אם מוציא בשפתיו אע"פ שאינו מבין אפילו פירוש המילות מפני שהוא עם הארץ הרי זה מקיים מצות "ולמדתם" ולפיכך כל עם הארץ מברך ברכת התורה בשחר לפני הפוסקים וכן כשעולה לספר תורה, במה דברים אמורים בתורה שבכתב אבל בתורה

שבעל פה אם אינו מבין הפירוש אינו נחשב לו לימוד כלל

Clearly, the ba'al hatanya holds that in torah sh'bal peh, one who does not understand isn't learning at all (although he writes afterward that he should still read through the material because in the world to come he will merit to understand all the torah that he read, but his mind couldn't grasp on this world).

The magen avrohom (50:2) seems to disagree and hold that we don't make any distinction between torah she'biksav and torah she'bal peh. One who doesn't understand is not considered to be learning at all.

But, R' Menachem Levin pointed out to me that the Maharil in the teshuvos (chadashos 45) may hold exactly the opposite of the magen avrohom. The context of the maharil is a justification for woman making birkas hatorah, even though we consider women learning to be "tiflus". The maharil argues: 1. The rambam says that tiflus is only in the oral torah, but not the written. 2. even in oral torah, it is tiflus to teach her, but if she learns herself she gets reward like an eino metzuveh v'oseh. 3. they have a mitzvah to learn mitzvos that pertain to them, as we see that even a goy receives reward for learning the mitzvos that pertain to him. 4. The Rabbonon were mesaken sections of torah that should be recites as a tefillah, such as seder korbanos, which women need to say and need to make birchas hatorah on. In the course of the final argument, the maharil writes:

ואם כן מחייבי נמי לסדר ענייני קרבנות, קראי, ושמא נמי מתניתין דאיזהו מקומן, ותפילות אין שייך דאינן מבינות, ומ"מ הוי כאילו הקריבו קרבן משום עקימת שפתים, דליגרוס איניש אע"ג דלא ידע מאי קאמר, ופשיטא דאיש חייב לברך אע"ג דאין מבין קריאתו וגרסתו

The maharil seems troubled by saying birchas hatorah on sections of korbanos that they don't understand, to which he responds that the reading itself demands a birchas hatorah, even without any understanding. However, it is not clear to me that these statements of the maharil are going on the oral torah. Perhaps the maharil agrees with the shulchan aruch ha'rav and holds that the written torah requires a birkas hatorah even without understanding, but not the oral torah.

In light of this, i think it is a fair question whether merely translating the stories of rabba bar bar chana qualifies as "understanding" torah she'bal peh and warrants a birchas hatorah, or not? The Rashbam at the start of the sugya refers to the stories as שיחת חולין של תלמידי חכמים, which may indicate that unless one spends time learning the meaning, it is no more than sichas chulin.

I attached a link, >CLICK HERE< to the commentary of the GR"A on the Aggados of Rabba bar bar Chana. I found it online at hebrewbooks.org and deleted the parts that weren't pertinent (it begins on page 7) and serves as the basis for "the juggler and the king", by the rosh yeshiva of ner yisroel.

The story of the Frog:

Rabba Bar Bar Chana saw a frog that was the size of the city Hagrunya, which was 60 houses. A snake came and ate the frog. A raven came and ate the snake. The Raven then sat on a tree. Come see the strength of the tree. R' Papa Bar Shmuel commented that if he would not have been there, he would not have believed it.

GR"A explanation:

The Midrash says in Shemos, why were the Egyptians punished with frogs? Because they stopped the Jews from studying Torah, who resemble the frog that doesn't stop making noise day and night. A frog is symbolic of a talmid chacham who doesn't stop studying torah. Rabba tells that he saw a "frog" that was as large as a city of 60 houses, meaning that he was an expert in all 60 tractates - the entire shas. A snake came and swallowed the frog. The snake symbolizes the yetzer ha'rah. There are 2 types of yetzer ho'rah: One works on the land focusing on the "amei ha'aretz" and is called a "nachash", the other focuses on the sea, meaning on those who delve into the yam ha'talmud and is called a "tanin". The tanin came to swallow up the talmid chacham and disturb him from his studies. But then, a raven came and swallowed the snake. The raven refers to the talmid chacham who is mean to his children like a raven, being to preoccupied with torah study to provide sufficient parna'sah to his family (based on the gemara in kesubos). Generally the yetzer ho'rah will use the claim of parnasah to disturb the talmid chacham from his studies, therefore it is the one who can behave like a raven that has the ability to swallow the yetzer ho'rah. The gr"a points out that this is meduyak in rashi who writes that the raven is a mother bird. The nature of the mother raven is a polar opposite of other mothers, in that it shows little regard for it's young. That is why it refers to a talmid chacham who ignores his family and delves into torah study. The raven then sits on a tree. The tree symbolizes those who support talmidei chachamim. The "raven" has no parnasah, but Hashem will provide a "tree" for the raven to support him. Come see the strength of the tree. We find both by the brachos of Yakov and the brachos of Moshe that he mentions Zevulun, the supporter, before Yissoscher, the learner. Why? Because the supporter of Torah overcomes the yetzer ho'rah to use his wealth for luxuries on this world, and channels it toward supporting Torah. The one who supports the Talmid Chacham is in many ways greater than the Talmid Chacham because he overcomes his yetzer horah more than the talmid chacham himself. It is for this reason that the angel of Eisav who saw that he could not win out over Yakov, he hit Yakov in the leg. The leg symbolizes the support of the talmid chacham. When the yetzer horah fails with the talmidei chachamim, he sometimes is successful by attacking the supporter of Torah, so that he discontinues support. R' Papa bar Shmuel said that if he didn't see it he would believe it, because in Bavel there weren't any major supporters of Torah. It is only because he was in Eretz Yisroel did he merit to see such strong tree - this level of support for Torah.