Hearos (Insights) on Daf Yomi

The Chochmas Adam writes that there was a custom in vilna to be meikel to lend with interest. Reuven wanted to borrow from shimon and pay interest. Even if Reuven had no assets he would approach shimon and be modeh that he has tangible movable assets that are worth 10k. Reuven agrees to sell these item to shimon for 8k that shimon will be paying for today. Shimon agrees to provide Reuven either with these items or with 8k plus 20% instead (which will still be less than the objects worht 10k that reuven would otherwise have to give to shimon). This type of set up is done so that reuven never becomes a borrower from shimon, rather he agrees to provide him with the merchandise that shimon purchased or with something to replace the merchandise, namely 8k + 20%. The main issue that the chochmas adam has with this heter is that the entire hoda'ah that reuven actually posseses these items is complete sheker and therefore cannot be used. However, in a case where reuven actually does have items that are worth 10k, he allows such a deal. The binas adam (5) tries to justify why the rabbonim are meikel to allow even the first type of deal through hoda'ah. He suggests that the ribbis in this case isn't d'oraysa, only d'rabonon and in a situation where people are pressed for parnassah there is room to be meikel with ribbis d'rabonon, but it is certainly not an ideal way to pay interest.

There is a machlokes Taz (170:3) and nekudas hakesef whether one can hire someone to be an cosigner on a loan where the cosigner has full responsibility as much as the borrower himself (areiv shluf dotz). The Chochmas Adam in his sefer Binas Adam (sha'ar mishpat tzedek 2) points out that this discussion took place before the ritva on baba metzia was accessible. However, now that it is accessible the answer is resolved. Rava says that Reuven may pay Shimon to go convince Levi to lend money to Reuven because reuven is only paying shimon for s'char amira. The ritva asks why does the gemara need to be matir based on this rationale, it should be mutar anyway based on the other rationale that the gemara suggests that the torah only forbids ribbis that is paid directly from the borrower to the lender. The ritva answer that we are speaking about a case where Levi refuses to lend money to reuven, but is willing to lend it to shimon who then goes and lends it to reuven. Even though it turns out that technically shimon is the one who lends to reuven and therefore when reuven pays him it is ribbis that is paid from the borrower to the lender, it is nonetheless permitted since it is only s'char amira. The binas adam learns from the ritva that it is only is a situation where reuven doesn't request of shimon to be an areiv shluf dotz, rather shimon decides on his own to borrow from levi and lend it to reuven. But, if reuven would be paying shimon to be such a high level areiv, it is as if he were hiring shimon to borrow from levi and then lend to him which is an issur of paying ribbis since it is no longer just s'char amira.

There is a machlokes Rav and Shmuel how the investing partner must compensate the managing partner for the labor that is invested in the iska deal. Rav says that they can set a bar, until 33% profit they will split evenly, but beyond the 33% the managing partner can keep it all. Shmuel says that this doesn't work because profits may never reach 33%, so the investor must ensure at least some money that the managing partner will definitely receive as compensation for his work.

Tosafos asks, how can rav allow this, since the profits may not exceed 33% and Rav doesn't hold like R' Yehuda who is matir tzad echad b'ribis? Tosafos answers that it is very common for the profits to exceed 33% and is therefore permitted. Tosafos seems to be matir based on the fact that the violation of ribbis is only d'rabonon, and since there is a strong chance that it won't be a problem of ribbis it is permitted. Tosafos made a similar point on 68b by the eggs.

Why does Tosafos need this. The fact that there is a chance of profits exceeding 33% places a cash value on that chance. Why isn't the chance also valued as a definite amount that he manager would be receiving since it is in his control to sell that chance to someone else for real money? It should be similar to the gemara in makos where we deal with the zechus s'feiko and zechus s'feika by evaluating what someone would pay for that chance. Here too, someone would pay a real cash value for the chance of winning all profits that exceed 33%?

The Mishneh L'Melech (hilchos malveh 4:2) quotes a Rashba who is medayek from our gemara that the issur of avak ribbis is only an issur d'rabonon on the lender, not on the borrower. The gemara says that R' Ilish would never have signed a contract of Iska that would consider him a borrower on half, because the work that he would be doing for the lender would be considered ribbis and "rav ilish would not feed issur to the lender". The implication is that the only issur on the borrower of avak ribbis is an issur lifnei iver that you are causing the lender to violate an issur d'rabonon of taking ribbis, but there isn't any specific issur d'rabonon on the borrower of avak ribbis. This is also paskened in the Rama (y.d. 160) who quotes this from the Rosh, that the borrower of avak ribbis is only in violation of lifnei iver.

The Chavos Da'as points out that perhaps there is a specific issur d'rabonon on the borrower to pay avak ribbis, but in this case r' ilish died before he actually paid it. Had R' Ilish stayed alive, perhaps he wouldn't have paid the avak ribbis because it is an issur. The gemara therefore can only make its point by saying that R' ilish wouldn't have entered into an agreement by signing a contract that would state an obligation to "feed issur to the lender" because this is also lifnei iver.

The gemara 61b made a distinction between רבית קצוצה and אבק רבית. The beis din forces the return of ribbis ketzutza but does not force the return of avak ribbis (tosafos 62a cites 2 opinions if there is any point in returning ribbis ketzutza according to the opinion that it need not be returned. Perhaps avak ribbis which according to everyone does not NEED to be returned, would also be dependent on those 2 opinions whether it is proper to return. There is also a machlokes rishonim whether the borrower can grab back avak ribbis or not - see rosh).

Ribbis Ketzutza would be when the ribbis is an agreement in the loan, lending $10 and obligating the borrower to return $15. Avak Ribbis is any situation where the interest isn't guaranteed. Rashi 62b explains that when the lender takes a field as collateral and eats the fruits without deducting a penny from the loan, it is only avak ribbis since there is a possibility of the land not producing any fruits that year so that the ribbis isn't guaranteed. Included in avak ribbis would be all cases of buying and selling, when there isn't an actual loan.

We already mentioned this issue in baba kama 94 - there is a machlokes rambam and tur whether one is obligated to honor a father who is a rasha. The Rambam holds that there is a mitzva of kibud av, but the Tur uses our gemara to disagree. See here for the discussion about it:

Perhaps we can offer another rationale to justify the position of the Rambam so that he is not contradicted by the gemara. The gemara isn't claiming that only for an עושה מעשה עמך is there a mitzvah of kibud av, to the exclusion of a rasha. The gemara isn't dealing in general with the mitzvah of kibud av, rather it is dealing with whether the children are obligated to return an object that was taken as ribbis or stolen, that they inherited from their father. Perhaps the gemara is saying that although they are commanded in the mitzvah of kibud av, they wouldn't be required to return the object. Why? Because when the father didn't do teshuva in his lifetime and didn't return the object, it is as if the father was mochel on this aspect of his kavod. However, if the father did teshuva and wanted to return it but didn't get a chance, then the sons would be obligated to return this item for kavod of their father as they would be chayev in all kavod of their father.

Another distinction made by the kesef mishna is that so long as the father is alive, even if he is a rasha he may do teshuva and therefore there is a mitzvah of kavod to honor him. However, when he dies a rasha there is no longer a mitzvah to honor him since he definitely will not do teshuva.

The gemara explains that the torah uses the term "ha'ma'aleh" in the context of the issur shertatzim to indicate that this is a special advantage to klal yisroel and had Hashem only taken us out of mitzrayim for this alone, it would be worth it. The gemara continues to explain that although the reward for abstaining from sheratzim cannot be as great as ribbis and ona'ah where there is a strong yetzer hora, nevertheless since they are disgusting it is considered a ma'aleh of klal yisroel. Rashi explains that since these things are inherently disgusting, it is considered to be a ma'aleh for klal yisroel that they abstain from them and don't sustain themselves from things that are so repulsive.

R' Moshe (dibros hea'ra 15) is troubled by this. The only problem with sheratzim is that they are forbidden, but there is nothing inherently disgusting about them. Why are sheratzim considered to be a bigger ma'aleh than any other forbidden foods? - it is only the issur that makes it repulsive, not the metzius. To strengthen the question, we can cite the midrash that rashi quotes in chumash that a person should not say that they are repulsed by pork, rather they abstain only because of the issur torah. The same should apply to bugs, one should not necessarily be repulsed, yet abstain because of the issur torah.

It seems to me that rashi understands that sheratzim are inherently disgusting. You are what you eat. Therefore, it is a ma'aleh for klal yisroel that Hashem forces us to refrain from these foods.

R' Moshe suggests that the ma'aleh is somewhat different. There are many goyim who also refrain from eating bugs because they are disgusted by it. But, they don't check their vegetables for bugs. Abstaining form something because it is disgusting and repulsive has its limits, it won't cause you to search to find it. However, we abstain from bugs because of the issur and therefore make ourselves crazy to inspect vegies to find them. This is the ma'aleh of klal yisroel - the contrast of abstaining from issur vs. abstaining out of disgust. The effort put into staying away from issur BECAUSE IT IS ASSUR is the ma'aleh for klal yisroel.